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"Whatever one's appraisal of Harry Truman as 
President, he commands admiration for his indomi-
table courae:e through the election ye ar . On the 
other hand, what happened to Dewey is a classic 
example of what the Greeks call hubris , the pride 
before the fall. Yet, there is no room for any-
one to t hrow scorn or dirision. All ssw through 
the rlass darkly in 1948 . Circumstances contrived 
a gigantic comedy and pulledall lilte puppets . One 
can almost hear Puck in the wings, ' What fools 
these mortals be.' The experience should be a so-
bering reminder of human fallibil1ty . 11 1 
As election day in 1948 drew nearer, political 
pollsters, pros and amateurs united in predicting vic-
tory for Thorna.s E, Dewey. Only underdcg candidate Pres-
ident Truman and, aa it turned out, the American elector-
2 
ate disa~reed with t his consensus. 
At t he end of 1947 Truman was ccnsidered certain 
for renomination by his party, and the Gallup Poll 
ahm.,ed that he would easily defeat either of the two 
leaaing Reuublicana--Governor Dewev and Senator Taft. 
A get- tough policy with Russia had pushed up his popu-
lari.ty--the IVlarshall l?lan, his advoc acy of gevernment 
acti on to curb hign prices, his confrontation with labor 
leader ,John L. Lewis which ended in a Truman victory, 
all had boosted his popularity. The '47 November elec-
tiona had broup·ht favorable omena, after the devastating 
defea~ in the Congressional elections of '46, with Deru-
ocra.ts \rllnl'ling many loeal elections. On November 7 
-2-
poll tical commentator David La,wrence said, 11 1'he che.nces 
are less th~n even that the Republ icans wlll wln in 1948 
3 
no matter whom the Republicans select a,s their candidate. 11 
But with in four months univer sal pessimism had set 
i n . Truman was considered a certain loser, and there 
v1as a strong dr1 ve to deny h i m renominat ion. Never has 





There is a quality of drama to Truman ' s life 
story . He had been lifted from relative obscurity to 
the Presidency by the unpredictable processes of Vice 
Presidential selection and the death of FDR. 
Harry Truman was born on May 8 , 1884 ln Lamar , 
Missouri. His father was a fa,rmer and a mule trader. 
Harry never got beyond high school, owing to a finan-
cial disaster t 1 a t befell his father. He worked as a 
timekeeper, a bank clerk and returned to the family 
farm a t age twenty-two . He was fond of playinr the 
piano , reading history , the Nasonic Lodge and National 
Guard drill. World War I d1slod~ed him from his com-
fortable rut . Captain Trwnan discovered in France, 
1918 that ho could command men , and he cPme out of the 
5 
war with new found self-confidence . 
After the war Truman married Bess WaJlace and 
invested in a haberdashery that was forced to close 
during the depression in 1922 . He t hen turned t o pol-
itics under the sponsorship of the powerful Penderr.aet 
organization. The Pendergaets' needed a candidate for 
county judge of' Jackson County, Missouri . They chose 
Truman t o run, and he won the general election with 
ease . He now had a $3 , 000-a-year ,l ob and a new career. 
Two years later he was defeated--the only elector al 
defeat in his career--but made a comeback in 1926 when 
he was elected presidinf judRe . He served in this 
-4--
capacity for eig1lt years and earned a r eputation for 
being a conscientious official and an honest one--a 
6 
rare distinction in that urea. 
Truman was :Just a small cor in the Fendergast 
machine . He always main tained that Tom Pendergast 
never asked him to do a dishonest deed, but his rep-
utation suffered f rom guilt by association--a loyal 
association with one of the most corrut.)t poll tical 
machines in the country. In 1934 the Pendergasts' 
needed a senatorial candidate. 'l'hey finally turned 
to Judge 1'ruman who was eac:er for the chance, fought 
7 
hard and won. 
In Washington 'rruman was lmown as " the Senator 
:Vrom Pendergast." It was a very painful situation 
for him since no ome judged him on his ability ~t 
only on hi a baclcground. He was largely i gnored. Even 
though he had quietely brol"en with Tom Pendergast, he 
refused to turn his back on his friends or to sppear 
weak by stabbing the people who helped him. Truman voted 
straignt New beal and e reatly admired FDR; but the White 
House held him at arm's length because of the Pendereast 
aroma around him. Truman did not know it, but FDR was 
8 
out to break Pendergast. 
By the time Truman came up for re-election in 1940, 
Tom .Penderr:.a st was in jail. FDR sent a messGge to Truman 
that if he did not care to run for re-election, he'd be 
glad to e;i ve hill a seat on the Interstate Co.,,merce Commi-
sion. Ilir. Roosevelt said he didn't th:t11llt M.r . Truman should 
9 
care to run. 
-5-
i".r . Truman thouc;ht he should l However, FDH 1 s offer 
was a measure of how far the errand boy had come ; it was a 
considerable show of' recognition from the man who didn't 
even want to meet him four years earlier , and was now will ing 
to take the trouble he 1 d g-et for e-iving a good appointment 
to the notorious henchman of T. J. tendergast . 10 
The fender~ast machine was in ruins; Truman was on his 
own. With mea~er funds and a hastily improvised or~anization 
he won the primary over FDR 1 s man by only 7 , 600 votes ~ It 
waa the triumph of the underdo~ and a foretaste of 1948. 
He ran on his record, as he was a,lways point to run - the 
record said that Har·ry was an honest man . It became clear 
from this election that Harry Truman had been running for 
Himself for a lone time - since way back in 1922 when he 
ran for county judee. 11 
l t wa.s in hie second term that Truman made his mark 
as a senator by chairinp: the ''Truman Commi ttee 11 , an ad-hoc 
committee established ln 1941 to inve stigate the national 
defense pror ram . This committee was a cone:rc ssional con-
science and auditor of the entire war production program 
crusading against bureaucratic w·aste of all kinds. By the 
time Truman resigned as chairman in 19ll4, it had sa:ved the 
taxpayers over fifteen billion dollars. 12 
The conunl ttee gave Tru man the sort of reputation which 
leads to a lifetime Senate seat. Bu t in ~ay, 194~ a Southern 
revolt against Vice President Henry Wallace, who was re-
Farded as too left-wing, caused the Presi dent to accept a 
-6-
new running mate. Truman emerged aa the choice . He was 
an excellent selection for he had an impeccable New Deal 
record, he was acceptabl e to the South and in good stand-
ing with labor, was something of a hero as a war investi-
13 
gator and he had no enemies. 
Less than three months after Truman took office as 
Vice Presid£:nt, Roosevelt suffered a cerebral hemorrhage . 
The death of Roosevelt catapulted Truman into that elite 
circle of thirty-three men who have held the of fice of 
President, But Trurnan was unprepared; FDR had not groomed 
any man to be his successor . Truman had to conclude 
America ' s participation in World War II and help estab-
l ish peace. He was confronted with occupation problems 
in Germany, Austria and Japan and i'tas totally unfamiliar 
with Roosevelt's secret understandings with Churchill and 
Stalin . Within the year he was called upon to ride the 
swift current of irritated public opinion flowing out of 
14 
America's readjustment to peacetime. As Truman himself 
said : 
11 I felt that I had lived five lifetimes in my 
first five days as President. I was beginning to 
realize how little the Founding Fathers had been 
able to anticipate the preparations necessary for 
a man to become President so suddenly. l t is a 
mighty leap from the Vice President to the Presi-
dency when one is forced t o make it without warn-
ing . Under the present system a Vice President 
cannot equip himself to become President merely 
by virtue of being second in ranl{." 1 5 
While the nation mourned FDR's death, Truman en-
joyed a. honeymoon with Cone;ress as with the country. 
At one point President Truman had a ~reat er popularity 
-7-
with the American public tban did Roosevelt or Eisen-
hewer. Yet he war more often a minority than a majority 
16 
President in public opinion polls. 
Truman was swept along by the momentum of things 
started under Roosevelt. Shortly after he took office, 
an international gathering at San Francisco began to 
draft the charter for the United Nations. On I>1ay 8, 1945 
Germany collapsed. Just as he was about to discuss 
Germany's fate at Fotsdam, he was informed that the 
United States now had a successful atomic bomb. Truman 
promptly issued a decree for Japan to unconditionally 
surrender or f a ce utter destruction. A new era in war-
fare opened when Truman ordered the atomic bomb dropped 
on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Japan surrendered less 
17 
t han five months aft er he took office. 
Disenchantment, when it came, was gradual and it was 
both personal and political. As .President, Truman se.:.:med 
hopelessly mi scast, l a cking the dignity or charm of hie 
able predecessor. His personality delighted some, dis-
mayed ot~ers, but the main concern was over the way he 
faltered and fumbled under the weight of responsibility. 
" ••• the plain people still liked Harry Truman as 
a plain man, but he was not a President who imspired 
their high confidence and enthusiastic admiration •••• 
A great many of the U. S. people felt sorry for h,im." 18 
Truman 1 s method for handling the railroad strike in 
May, 1946 enraged his labor supporters and left many cit-
izens wi th s erious doubts concerning his jud8ement . After 
months o1' deadlocked negotiations, a nationwide railroad 
strike was called. A crisis atmosphere developed for the 
-8-
coal mines wel"'e also on strike, and the country had re-
cently been harassed by a massive strike wave in steel and 
19 
other industries. Truman spol<::e to the leaders of the 
railroad unions saying : 
'' If you think I'm going to sit here and let you tie 
up this whole country, your crazy as hell. " 
11 We've got t o go through wlth it, Mr. President," 
Whitney said . "Our men are demanding it." 
-
Truman got up from his dest . "All right, I'm going 
to g ive you the gun. You've got just 48 hours-~until 
Thursday at this time--to reach a settlement. If you 
don 1t I'm going to t ake over the railroads in the name 
20 
of the government." 
I n a dramatic appearance before a joint session of 
Cdmgress, Truman demanded the right to draft strilcens 
into the army whenever national safety was imperiled . 
During his speech he was informed that an agreement had 
been reached, but he stuck. to his legislative proposal. 
Thi s incident was probably Truman's most rash and poten-
tially dungerous acts as President. It did JDU.t a shine 
on Truman's l mae:e as a tough , determined, "to-hell-wit h-
where-the-chips-may- fall fighter for what he believed was 
r i ght. '' This eventually aided him in 1948 when labor 
finally came back to his corner. But for now he lef t 
2 1 # 
l abor cold . 
As the 1946 congressional elections approached, 
Truman had· been in off ice nineteen months . He had pre-
sided over the f inal victory in the war, but t he mood 
* see illustra tion page 9a 
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of exultation and hope had ~radually faded. In his major 
end~avor at home--to hold t he line on prices and wages--
he 11ad failed. The cost-of-living index leaped from 76.9 
at the end of 1945 to 83 .4 a year later a ~d to 102.8 by 
1948. :Price increases brought wage increases which \•rere 
preceded by strikes. Ordinary consumers, caught in the 
price squeeze and plagued by shortages of meat, automo-
biles, housing and other needs turned their irritation on 
the most obvious scapegoat--the President and the Demo-
22 
cratic administration . 
"Among the members of his own pa.rt;y, 11 the New 
York Times reported late in 1946, "the prevailing 
attitude toward the ~resident is one of simple des-
pair and futility. Most seem to think he has done 
the best be could, but that his best simply was not 
good enough." 23 
As the midterm election campaign warmed up, the 
Republicans, with rare genius, sununed up the national 
mood providing a focus for resentment with 11 Hac1 enough? 11--
2~~ ~it 
one of the most dev~stating campaign slogans of all time. 
November S--election day. When it was over, the 
Republicans had talcen control of Conp;ress for the first 
time in sixteen years. The crushing defeat brought more 
comfort to Harry Truman than despair . It lifted twin 
25 
burdens from the :President's shoulders. 
When Truman came to the Presidency he was a moderate 
oonserv~:.tive, but he had inherited a liberal mandate, a 
set of llberal advisers and a fe eling of obligation to 
defer to his dead predecessor 's wishes. Inescapably, 
Truman found himself maldng statements and advocatine; 
1roca- see illustration page 9a 
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policies in which he personally did not wholeheartedly 
believe. Therefore , his administration talked out of' the 
left side but longed for the right so it was bound to 
26 
stumble and drag its feet. 
But With defeait. in 1 946 , the mandate won by Roosevelt 
in 1941+ was lifted. Truman was free to be his own man--
or to be his own :President. He could now go in any direc-
tion he wished. Second--the ReEublicans now had the re-
sponsibility of finding solutions for the problema of 
poat-\-iar United States . Truman now had his own scapegoat 
27 
to use as an excuse when things weren 't going well . 
Shortly after the election Truman's fortunes began to 
improve . A new e.nd refreshing f,·'i1uk. moved into the intel-
lectual void around the President . Clark Clifford , smart, 
able , diplimatic young lawyer from St. Louie had been pro-
moted to the post of legal counsel to the President. 
Clifford did not talk or look like a New Deal liberal, 
though he was . and he gradually won Truman's full confi-
dence becoming his chief' speech writer and administrative 
28 
coordinator. 
Truman t col{ a firm line against a strike called by the 
United I~ne Workers, proposed the policy to aid Turkey and 
Greece which became known as the "Truman Doct.rine"--Arneri-
Ca.Yl Au.ppo-rt for nations everywhere which were rP-siFJtine 
Communist pressure--ana launched the Marshall Plan. These 
new ventures displayed Truman for the first time in full 
command of the powers of his office. By following his own 
advisers, Truman was beginnine.: to win back large numbe·rs 
-11-
of disaffected voters. By July, 1947, Dr. George Gallup 
released his ne"' poll which found 55 percent of the public 
now favored the Democrats in a Presidential election--com-
pared to 47 percent who would have voted for a Democratic 
candidate in December, 1946, Gallup spoke of the Demo-
29 
crats as having executed '1a major political feat." 
By mid-1947 the Truman administration's policy in 
domestic affairs was made clear when Truman vetoed the 
T~ft~Hartley Act which imposed significant restrictions 
on the exercise of labor's power in collective bargaining. 
This was a. major victory for Truman's liberal advisors 
led by Clark Clifford. Suddenl y Truman emere:ed as the 
ohampion of the labor movement little more than a year 
after he had demanded power to put the railroad strikers 
into the army. This Taft-Hartley veto was the first 
m~jor step in closing the gap between the inner convic-
tions and public utterances of Harry Truman. The veto 
message was ineffective since Congress passed the law 
over Truman's veto . But t : is restored standing with the 
unions made it likel y that they would supyort him in the 
30 
Presidential election the followi ng year. 
It was one of the misconceptions--perhaps a public 
relations triumph--of the 1948 Democratic campaign that it 
generally gave the impression of being "an improvised, 
desperate effort of an embatt led President fighting 
31 
single-handedly against over-whelming odds." There is 
little doubt about the desperation of the campaign, but 
it was not improvised. The campaign was carefully planned 
every step of the way. The r.teneral lines of strategy were 
-12-
drawn as early as autumn of 191.q. These wer e a basic blue-
print written by Clifford in a lene:thy memorandum on "the 
1)011 tics of 194G. 11 Wnen Clifford began his paper in 1947, 
Tr•urnan wo. s not really the underdog; no one had any reason 
to predict a Southern revel t and Henry 'iJ'alla.ce had not de-
clared his candidacy . However, none of those involved in 
the project were ove rly optimistic. The 1946 defeat was 
still fresh in their memory; the Republicans had many able 
32 
candidates; the UJreat of Henry Wa.llace was obvious. 
In min-November Cliffol"d present ed Truman with a ~J-
page document--bold and clear in its analysis of present 
trends, accurate in predictin~ the future, and proposing a 
course of action for Trtunan to follow for the next tvrelve 
months. 
It was predicted that Thoma.s E. Dewey would be the 
Rewublican candidate; Henry Wal lace would run on a third-
party ticl~et; .President Truman could win even with t he loss 
of the big Eastern states if he held the South, 1tlest and 
labor vote. Events confirmed these judgements. Clifford 
Wo:-S wrong in one prediction . 11As slways, the South can be 
considered safely Democratic, and in formulating national 
policy, 1 t can be SB.fely i gnored. 11 This time the South 
33 
simply refused to follow standard procedure. 
rrruman read the document and ap·reed vii th Clifford's 
analysis. The concept of a bold, uncompromising offensive 
with the State of the Union messa~e on J'anuar :y 7. 
-13-
chapter iii 
Harry Truman's State of the Union message , delievered 
before Congress at 1 :30 P . t·J . January 7, 1 948 , was the open-
ine; r.;un of his reelection campaign that vias to last for ten 
months. This speech vras to announce the poll tical program 
34 
on which the President would campaign. Clark Cl ifford's 
young assistant G-eorge M. Elsey said that the spee ch : 
11 
••• must be controversial as hell, mt1st state the 
issues of the election, must draw the line sharply 
between Republicans and Democrats . The Democratic 
platforrrJ will stem from it, 'and the election will be 
fought on the issues it presents ." 35 
The reaction of the Republican dominated Eightieth. 
Congress was "extraordinarily chilly . 11 Seven times Truman 
paused for applause and there was none. Democrat Lowell 
Mellett wrote: 
11 The reception for Har~J Truman was markedly like 
that given the Polar explorers by their i mmediate 
acudience--a circle of correctly attired penguins. A 
few penguins on that day fla t l ed their wings . 11 36 
The major thrust of the message dealt with domestic 
i ssues . Truman requested a mult-pronged social program 
+ 
includine expanded social security, health insurance , Fed-
eral aid .for education , Federal housing , extended farm 
supports , conservation of natural resources and higher 
minimum wae;es. The r·e was also one novel approace which 
showed the Truman touch--he proposed that ea.ch taxpayer 
should be able to deduct forty dollars from his tax bill 
for himself and each dependent . Simple; uncluttered by 
37 
fe.ncy mathematics; something every voter could understt:' nd . 
-14-
~1e President came out fully clad a New Deal liberal, 
and those on the left and right knew the reason--on Decem-
ber 29 Henry Wallace had entered the political picture with 
a third party. Truman's pr ogram v1as designed ln part to 
38 
steal the thunder of Wallace 's proeressive party. 
The Democrats greeted his speech with something less 
than enthusiasm; the Republicans called it "a labored effort 
to promise all things to Qll people; 11 ' the press particularly 
cri tized the forth dollar tax credi.t as 11unm1 tiga tedly dem-
39 
agogic ••• explicable as a trasparent political move. " 
The State of the Union message to Congress designed to 
keep the President's program in the headlines. Truman was 
exploiting one of the major benefits Of the Presidential 
office during election year--the power to create publicity 
just by beinr. the Freaident. The slogan around the White 
House was "hit 'em every Monday," as Truman gave the Congress 
much unsolicited advice. He issued his economic report; 
Reorganizational Plan I of 1948; plan forD waterway that 
would link the St. Lawrence River to the sea; a proposal for 
curbs on grain used in making ethyl alconol all in the month 
of January. Others from February to March concerned: civil 
rights, extension of wartime controls, highway construction, 
assistance to Greece and T.urkey, International Telecommuni-
cation Convention, assistance to China, U. B.-participation 
in the United Nations, housing , extension of the Reciprocal 
Trade Act. Most 4. f' not all of these ruessa.ces sought to 
dramatize the gulf between dynamic, a{fe·ressi ve, Democratic 
-15-
Presidential leadership and a stagnant, partisan, Repub-
lican Congress. 
By far the most improtant of these messages was the 
one on civil rights presented Februa:ry 2nd. 'I'ruman hEld 
established a Presidential Commit tee on Civll Rights in 
1946 under the chairmanship of Charles E. Wilson of Gen-
eral Electric . The committee's study, "To Secure These 
Rights, 11 made a number of drastic recommendations. On 
the basis of this study Truman made ten reco r:Jnendations 
to Congress: 
1 - enact modern civil rights laws adequate f or the needs 
of the day 
2 - legal attack against all forms of discrimina tion 
3 - anti-lynching legislation 
4 - end to segregation in interstate commerce 
5 - establishment of a Fair Employment Practices Commission 
6 - etron~er protection for the right to vote 
7 - rlpht to safety of person and property 
8 - self-government for the District of Columbia 
9 -- establishment of a per manent Commission on civil rights 
10 - elimination of discriminat i on in federal employment and 
40 
segreeation of the a rmed forces . 
This Presidential paper 1tras remarkable for it.s scope 
' 
and audactiy. Even FDR fiad never gone this far to aid Ne-
groes; he being politician enough to realize its fullest 
41 
implications . 
· There v-ra s an immedi a t e roar of indignation from the 
''ig:r.l.Orable" South. Representative Sam Hobbs accused the 
President of a desire ·"to keep t he South a conquer ed pro-
-16-
vince," and Representative Eugene Cox said, "Harlem is 
wielding more influence with the Administration than the 
entire white South ." Senator John Connally of Texas said 
42 
that it was a "lynchine of the constitution ." 
The President expected these repercussions and had 
announced his civil rights stand early in the year to give 
Southern tempers a chance t o cool off . Insteod he added 
fire to the already simmering pot of Southern revolt. At 
the Conterence of Southern Governors in Wakulla Sprin3s, 
Florida, the following \'leek, the revolt was given a chance 
to gather momentum. They eventually adopted a forty-day 
cooling-off period. But it was becoming obvious that 
something serious was in the works . Senator Eastland of 
Mississippi, labeling Truman a "carpetba,ggPr ," declared, 
11All we have to do is to refuse to vote t he ticket •••• 
By withholding the e l ectoral votes, the South can defea t 
43 
in 1945 any Democrati c candidate ." 
In order to placate the dissident Southerners, 
'I'ruman quitely backed away from initiating action to get 
his civil rights legislation passed. Hls two executive 
orders on federal employment and the problem of the armed 
forces were not released until after t he stormy Democratic 
Convention. Truman did everything possible, short of going 
back on his February 2nd speech, to keep t~e Dixiecrats in 
.lj.4 
the party. 
Another serious blow came to the Democrats a few days 
after the civil rights message when the question concerning 
the extent of support for Henry Wallace was answered. On 
-17-
F~bruary 17th in a special election for Congress held in the 
24th Congressional District of the B:flonx, supposedly a strong-
hold of' Democratic boss Ed Flynn , the American-Labor candidate 
Leo Isacson, backed by Henry Wallace, trounced his Democratic 
and Liberal opponents by a two to one margin. This indicated 
that Wallace's strength could cost the Democrats New York and 
other Eastern states in the Presidential election. Wallace 
had campaigned in the district which was 35% Jewish saying, 
"Truman talks J ewish but acts Arab. 11 Al though the Illnited 
Nations , under pressure by the United States, had passed 
through a resolution for partition of Pal estine on November 
29, the United States had then issued an arms embarge on 
December 5. Jews and Arabs were now fi~hting with hundreds 
45 
being :killed. 
Under this cloud of prevailing doom , the Democratic 
Party held its annual Jefferson-Jackson Da~ dinner with the 
distinguished guest for the evening beine; President Truman . 
The atmosphere waa grim. Senator Olin Johnson of South 
Carolina had reserved an entire table right unde r· the eyes 
of the Fresident , then sent an aide to make sure the table 
remained vaca:ot . They spent #1 , 1.00 t o lteep that table vacant 
r e fusing to attend on the ground that since no segregation 
46 
was enforced they might have to dine wi th Negroes. 
The absence of prominent Southerners was very noticeable. 
There were fund-raising dinner parties throughout the South , 
as usual, but little if any of the proceeds found their way 
to the Democratic National Conmittee . At Little Rock Governor 
Laney tool\. a vote a·~ to whether the funds should be retaiad 
in Arkansas as a protest a~ainst tte President ' s civil ri~~ts 
-18-
program . The chairman c&lled the vote a tie and referred 
the money to the party's state committee . Soon afterward , 
when Harry 1 Truman 's dlnner speech was relayed from Washin;~ton, 
about 400 diners {750 present) got to t heir feet and quietly 
47 
l eft t he room. 
I f ever there was an office-seelcin6 pol l tician w1 th 
the chips stacked against him , it was Harry Truman--do-
nothinc;-right-Truman in those first months of 194-8. Late in 
February he took a break and went on a two weelc Caribbean 
cru.ise, This break and O'bhers greatly aided Truman since 
they brake the oppressive continui ty of growing hostilities 
and ga.ve time for h is natural self-confidence and optimism to 
recuperate . He returned loolcing Tan, rested and ready to 
fight . ~ioilday, lvlarch 8th , he called Dentocratio National 
Co'timittee Chairman Senator McGrath to his office. A little 
later McGrath , wi t J1 a h i nt of a smi le, wallced into a swarm 
48 
of reporters in t he White House lobby. 
11 The President," he told them, "has authorized me to 
say that if nominated by the Democratic Natlonal Convention 
4·9 
he will accept and r un ." 
By the end of March Tru.nan' s popul arity had hit rock 
bottom. He had retreated from his position calline for 
partitionllmrr Pale s tine and adopted the i dGa of t l::e temporary 
position of trusteeship . To the liberals t his was a complete 
sel l - out. Max Lerner voiced t~is sentiment for many: 11 0ne 
VTOuld have to [:O beck to I"lunich t o recall a sell-out as cynical, 
as bedraggled , as contemptible •• • • A man had t o have a genhs 
for blundering to have dome so complete a job of s t .rip;.ing 
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himself of the support of so many varied groups. '150 
The Democrat ic leaders could see their str• nge con-
glomeration of support bases l>eing pulled apart. The party 
was an amalgam of a conservative South, a progressive, or-
ganized labor move1nent , bi13-ci ty mo.chines, moderates, lib-
erals, i dealists, radicals , Jews and now Negroes--all fused 
together by the political genius of Roosevelt and torn apart 
by the particularly apt blundering of Trumm.n . The conviction 
that Truman was a dee.d duck was due basically t o t he fixed 
i dea tha t political analysts had been proclaiming for some 
time--that the dl nsolut ion of the Roosevelt c oalition wa s 
inevitable. To a large extent t he decline in Truman's 
poll tical strength was this sophistice.ted poti tical thirJcing 
becoming ingrained in the public psychology. Time and again 
political analysts wrote that anly t he war enabled Roosevelt 
to hold his coalition together i n 194l~--an idea impossible 
to challenge or substantiate . There is something to the 
belie f tr~t i f you say something aften enough, loud enough 
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people begin to believe it. 
In t he dark days of the spring of 19il-8 Truman was 
urged to withdraw . The belief in t he certainty of Truman's 
doom l ed to the most bizarre development of a rather bizarre 
campaign--the e ffort to draft General Dwight D. Ei senhower 
in place of Truman. (It has been reported t hat Truman offered 
t o withdraw if Eisenhower would consent to run with Truman 
as the Vice Presidential candidate. ·rruman de11ies this, and 
General Eisenhower aimpl~ says that a.ny t=~f f lrmation on t his 
should come from Truman or not at all.) By the end of March 
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the rebelllon was e r upting in all parts of tho nation . 
However , Eis·enhower was not inte rested in recei vinp the nom-
ina tion , a r.d the rebellion gradually died . Truman W<. s never 
worried about being denied renomination . He kne\.,r tha.t to 
a great degree the man sittlng in the 'Nhite House controlled 
his party 1 s C·-·mvention through nomine: the chairman, patron-
age which g ives c ontrol of party machinery dov-rn to the lowest 
precinct worker t hus e nabl ing tbe :President to corral con-
vention delegates, and U.1e belief' that to dump the party's 
leader, ther eby repudiating the r e cord of the party, is very 
dangerous . Once Truma.n hDd decided t o run there \'las little 
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that could be done to prevent renomina tion . 
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chapter iv 
The central theme of the President's campaig,n in 1948 
was his vendetta with the Repub1ican dominated Eightieth 
Coneress. This ~sa convenient piece of fiction contrived 
out of thin alr uy a mast er politician . Truman understood 
that the people have a distrust for their elected legisla-
tive body and are ready to blame them collect ~vely for the 
ills of the time~ therefore, he made the Eightieth 6~ngress 
his scapegoat. He i mpressed the people with his idea that 
the President and Vice Fresldent are the only two persons 
elected b:,r the whole country and repreoent all the people . 
The members of Congress, on the other hand, are elect t:""d by 
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sectional or special interest ~roups. 
The explosion aga inst the Ei Ehtie th Congress came 
suddenly in June . F'o:v the first five months of the session 
thEir were no signs of any unusual bad feelings between t he 
Fre sident and the Cone;ress; only the usual friction on do-
mestic affairs. The President set off on June 3rd in the 
Presidential Special for a cross-counnry trip to accept an 
honorary dee-ree at the Uni ve1"si ty of Cali fornia. This en-
abled him to list the trip as "non-:-poli tical" A.nd to have 
it paid for by the ree:ular treasury r ather than by the i m-
poverished Democratic National Committee. Congress v1as to 
adjourn June 1 S'th and Truman was cri ticizecl for ta.kine; "a 
self-servi ng .politica.l vacation at a moment when the whole 
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Government should be on the job in washlncton . 11 
-22-
Truman stopped for ma jor addresses, containing hl3 
personal message to the people, in five key cities and 
made many off-the-cuff rear-pll:.ttJform spf)eches . Truman 
jauntily announced that he was on hiB way 11 fur to get me 
a degree ." Having established the non-political pretext 
for his trip , he got dO\'In to his personal message: 11 TherEJ 
is juot one bir issue . It is the special interests against 
t he people, and tbe President being elected by all the 
people." Of course, the Republican Party in general 
and the Republican-controlled Eightieth Cone;ress in partic-
ular represented the special interests. 11You 1ve got the 
worst Congress in the Unlted States you've ever had . If 
you \vant to continue the policies of the Eightieth Congress, 
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1t 111 be your funeral . 11 
Truman kept blazing away , the cl"owds were hugh and 
enthusiastic, local politiciams told him that he day struck 
fire. He had taken the positio~ of the fir.hting champion 
of the people aeainst special interests . The first shouts of. 
''Give' eJ.Il hell, Harry l" were heard on this trip, and this 
soon bec~ne the battle cry of the Democratic campaign . 
Truman said t he cry was originated by some roan in Serttle 
with a big volce. Truman declared , "I told him at that time, 
and I have been r epeatlnr it ever since, tt~t I have never 
deli b e7'a tely given anybody hell. 1 just tell the truth on 
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the opposition--and they thinlc 1 t' s hell . 11 
Senator Taft protested bitterly, as did most Republl-
cana , tbe spectacle of the President heaping hell-fire and 
brimstone on the Cone:ress at the federal expense. "The 
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President , 11 said Taft, 11 is black~uardlng the Co ngre s s at 
every whistle station in t he country." With this Taft 
colned the term used to de s cribe Truman' s campaign-"whistle-
stopping." He also managed to wound the civic pride of 
57 
every place the President had spoke. 
The President was highly satisfied with his trip . As an 
extemporaneous speaker he inspired the crowds as hiEJ prepared 
apee ched cou ld never do . He established t he free-swine l ng 
style he was to use in later campai gn trips. Once Trumat1 
cawe out as his ovm man aft er 1946, he gr edually, t hough 
blundel"ine: at times, let his natural poli tical instincts 
take over . He believed in the people as strongly as he held 
the Congress, Party leaders and press in contempt. You 
might s ay he decided to "tell it lilre it isl" -this was 
something t he people could understand. 
chapter v 
As Truman slid do~mhill, the battle for the Repub-
lican nomination seemed to be all import ant since whom-
ever won would obviously be t he next President. The strug-
gle for the nomination is t he story of the rise and fall 
of Harold Stassen . Many Republicans believe th "' t if t he 
vigorous, yo•J.ng Stas ~·en had been nominated, he would have 
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been elected . 
The leading candidu te-.r were Governor Thomas E. De'tvey 
of New York, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio and underdog 
Harold Stassen . Dewey was the sweetheart of the liberal 
fac t i on of the Party . He had r i sen to prominence in t he 
1930 ' s as a racket-busting district attorney in New York 
City . In 1942 DeHey was t he f i rst Re_p1..1blican in twenty 
years to win the goveJ·norship of New York . He established 
a reputation as a mode cate econowically and socially with 
a t alent for effi cient management. In foreign affairs he 
was an advocate of the United Nations . He 1tron the Repub-
lican nomination in 1944- without actively aampai e;nin{j for 
it . He could not defeat the electorate ' s reluctance to 
turn out Roosevelt an Comma nder-inChief durln5 wartime , 
but did make a good sho'WinE. He was returned to the gover-
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nor ship of New York in t 946 by an impressive victory. 
However, Dewey was not a dramatic or compelling can-
didate. Many found his manner cold and smug . Time mag-
izine wrote of Dewey that he was '' to mechanistically 1)re 
cise to be l i ked, to wat chfully unbending to be confided, 
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too coldly ambltious to be loved ." But Dewey had a rich 
baritone voice, perfect for radio . He was clean ct1 t , well 
groomed and combined youthful v i e:or i'li th u kea.n sense of 
political awareness . The liberals fe l t he was perfect for 
the mood of the country - -a mood which they felt showed 
tiredness with the brash Democrats and rea.dy for a change 
for the cool steadiness of Dewey . This was their ereat 
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mi scalculation . 
Stubbornly opposed to the Dewey force o was the conser-
vative Old Guard of the G. O.P . I~s members were the grass-
roots workers who kept t he ~y together qetween national 
elections, and their champion in 1948 was Robert Alphonso 
Taft of Ohio. Taft had emer eed as a skillful political 
t actician and a fortl1ldable polit ical figure . He was t he 
actual leader of the Party in the Senate. Taft had come to 
symbolize thrift, honor, patriotism and other virtues they 
were clinging to in order to keep their sanity during the 
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two previous decades of bewilderine and fe~ rful change . 
Taft was a shy , dour- faced man almost totall y wi t hout 
personal magne tism • . His comu1ents on controversial issues 
were usually to bluntly honest and politically ill- considered. 
For insta.nce , in 1947 when food proces \'/ere slcyrooketine he 
advised the American people to "eat less ." Neve:r"theless, 
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he was the most seri ous threat to Dewey. 
The fact that t he Republicans had two lea.din(! candidates 
opened the door for the emergence of a compromise darkhorse- -
Harold Stassen . After Dev1ey won the New Hampshire primary 
in early .I11.1.arch , Stassen came to the front . In the first 
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big primary in Wisconsin on April 6 , Stassen pulled off a 
surprise, overwhelming victory over favorite son General 
Douglas MacArthur. Stassen then moved hie very effective 
organization into Nebraska where the three leaders cam-
paigned vigorously. Here Stassen won again. In the pri-
mary in Pennsylvania where no candidates were entered, 
Stassen received enough write-in votes to win. SUddenly 
the Gallup Poll had done a flip-flop, and Stassen pulled 
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ahead of Dewey. 
$tassen had captured the imagination of the public. 
The reasons for his tremendous success are the man himself--
he was youn~, only forty-one, and appealed to the young . 
ln 1938 he had sta,rtled the nation when at thirty-one he was 
elected governor of Minnesota. After wartime service ln the 
Navy, he returned to the political scene . His enthusiasm, 
drive and physical appearance radiated strength , purpose 
and decisiveness, He attrac ted youn~ lieutenants with ded-
6~ 
lcated zeal. 
Stassen declared his candidacy for the Fresidency ~n 
1946 and launched a campaign that tttas to cover 160 ,000 miles 
in forty-two states. As a midwesterner, Stassen appealed 
t o the conservatives; he was an internationalist reflecting 
the liberal temper of the times. lie seemed as bold and 
forthright as the title of his book Where 1 Stand. In the 
age of anxiety when there was a deep distrust of politicians , 
Stassen came forth as a new, unorthodox, forceful personality 
who had the self assurance to cope with the problema of 
the times. His chances looked good , but t hen came the mis-
take a. 
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Stassen's drivinF." ambition caused his first mistake--
pitting himself ar.ainst 1'aft in the Ohio primary on May 4th . 
Taft told Stassen honestly that Stassen could not win in 
Taft's home state, but Stassen took the advice as a sign 
of weakness. By the time St:ssen saw his mistake it was 
too late. Taft won the primary, and Stassen lost valuable 
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tlme from campaigning in Oreeon. 
Dewey knew the improtance of Oregan, where another 
Stassen triumph would almost assure Stassen the nomination. 
Dev1ey was takin13 no chances this time but campaigned lone; 
and hard. Now it W;-:~S st~· ssen ' s turn to panlc, and he did 
making a crucial error . He challene-ed Dewey to a debate 
on whether the Communist Party should be outlawed. Dewey 
eagerly accepted, His courtroom experience had been ex-
cellent training for such an encounter, and 1vhile the voters 
around the country listened on t heir radio Dewey tore Stassen's 
argulJ1ents to bits. Dewey won the primary a.nd greatly en-
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hanced his prestige nationwide. 
More than 2,000 deleeates and alternates gathered at 
Philadelphia on June 21st and watched tt:e dawn of a new 
political a~e--television had arrived. However~ its limited 
scope caused little change in the 19LI·8 conventions. The 
major decisions vvere still made in smolce-fil led back rooms, 
and only the 11 ins1ders 11 felt lilce it was a high-spiti ted. 
convention. To all outward appearances the Republicans 
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suffered from boredom within. 
Dewey arrived at Philadelphia with 350 votes, gathered 
in the primaries and behind the scenes . He only needed 200 
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votes to secure his nomination. 
De~tey had a highly efficient organization. While 
Stassen and Taflb were bickering among themselves, Dewey's 
men were out wheedling, cajoling and promising--or at least 
seeming to promise--in order to get the uncommitted dele-
gates . One state after another wavered and, fearful of 
being bypas sed by the Dewey bandwap:on, panicked and climed 
aboard. As a result, on the first ballot Dewey had 434 
votes , just 114 short of the needed majority. ~aft had 
224 votes and Stassen 157 . To maintain the psych.ological 
pressure Dewey's lead would have to ~row during the second 
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round; it did, to 515 votes only 33 short of nomination. 
Taft pla.ced a desperate call to Stassen saying the only 
way to stop Dewey was if Sts.ssen released his delegates to 
Taft. Stassen said he would on the fot~rth ballot, but 
by now Taft knew there would be no fourth balkt . Taft, 
Tfle a.rily, scribbled a few lines and sent the note to Ohio 
Senator John Bricker, who had placed Taft's name in nomi-
nation. Just before the third ballot began, Bricker read 
'raft ' s messare to the convention : "Dewey is a great Repub-
70 
lican, and he will make a e.:reat Republivan President ." 
Within a matter of minutes the other candidates also 
bowed out, and on the third ballot Dewey becarue the party 's 
choice. Dewey entered the hall and began his acceptance 
speech with : 11 1 come to you unfettered by a single obli-
gation or promise to any livin£5 person. " (The delegates who 
lcnew o:r the intensi-ve pre-balloting bargaining being done 
by Dewey's lieutenants were stunned. They soon found out 
that Dewey meant that, at lea st on the Vice Fresidency, 
whatever promisee his aides might he.ve made or implied 
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would not be binding on him.) 
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At 4 A. M. Dewey, after having conferred all evening 
with party leaders, called Earl Warren to his hotel and 
offered him the Vice Presidency. Warren had turned Dewey 
down in 1944, but he could not do so again and still retain 
his standing in the party. After receiving Dewey's promise 
to invest the Vice Presidency with meaningful responsibility, 
Warren acreed to run . Thus, the Republicans offered the 
electorate the governors of the two richest and most populous 
states. Warren's good-natured warmth nicely complemented 
Dewey's brisk, chilly manner, The Republican's had come up 
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with a very strong ticket to do ba l.tle with a "gone goose." 
-30-
chapter vi 
The stage was set. 'l'he Democrntlc Party was f30in.g to 
commit suicide just so Harry B. Truwan could run for Pres-
ident . The convention opened in Philadelphia, on July 12th. 
and it lo Jked like a massive funeral gathering. 
The first night , however, the Democratic Party caught 
fire, and the man who struck the match was Senator Alban 
Bark1w of Kentucky , convention keynoter . Barkley, long 
the Democratic leader of the Senate, a t seventy was one of 
the party's staunchest bulwarks and most colorful orators. 
He spolte for sixty-eight minutes announcinr. : 
" ~'le have assembled here for a e-rea t purpose . We 
are here to give the American people o.n accounting of 
our stewardship in the administration of thei r affairs 
for sixteen outstanding eventful years, for not one 
of which we make an apology. " 
The delegates, suddenly roused from their l ethargy , 
cheered. Barkley' later spoke of Dewey's promise to eliminate 
the cobwebs from the federal government . 
ul am not an expert on cobwebs, but if my memory 
does not betry me, when the Democratic Party took over 
the government of the United States sixteen years ago, 
even the spiders were so weak from starvation they 
could not weave a. cobweb in any department of the 
government. '1 73 
~fuen Bark~ finished, a twenty-eight minute demonstra-
tion bvoke out on t he floor. Few demonstrations of that 
duration are without advance planning, b'Ult there vras nothing 
synthetic about the afl.ection displayed for Barkly. For one 
moment he hao blotted out the frustrations of 1 9~ 8 and turned 
back the clock to the golden era of Roosevelt. His rewar d 
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was the Vice Presidential nom l nation. 
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Truman had wanted to bolster the ticket with a youngish 
New Dea ler, an.c'l his first choice had been Justice William 
0. Douglas . However, Douglas turned him down . This threw 
the Vice Presidency open, and when Barlt]ey' s speech made h im 
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the party's hero, Truman had to acce pt him. 
Before the convention closed , 'I'ruman received a.nother 
surprise. He had hoped t o minirulze the friction between 
southe rn and not-thern wings by having the platform committee 
adopt a mild plank on civil r~ghta. The committee a~reed 
over protestations of liberals led by Hubert H. Humphrey, 
the outspoken young ma~or of Minneapolis who wa s running 
for the Senate, and \'lho came into national prominence at 
this time . ~1en the platform reached the floor, Humphrey 
pr esented a minority report calling for the adoption of a 
stronper civil-rights plank . Humphrey orated, "I say the 
time has come to walk out of the shadow of stutes' rights and 
l nto the sunlight of hl l ffiBn rights • 11 The vote was a sensa-
tional upset with 651t for to 582t against. Thirty-five 
delegates from Mississippi and Alabama walked out of the 
convention in protest. In his memoirs, Truman cites an ex-
change between a rltlewsman and South Carolina's Governor J. 
Strom Thurmond. "President Truman is only following the 
platform tha t Roosevelt advocated, 11 the r eporter pointod 
out. "I agree, " Thurmond replied . "But Truman really 
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means it." 
Next came the main order· of business. The Southerners 
remaining t hrew their support to Senator Richard Russell of 
Georgia . But on the first ro •l call Truman got 947J and the 
nomination. Truman began his acceptance speech around 2 A. r~ . 
-32-
He reeled off a long list of Democratic achievements and 
again lashed. ovt at the sins of the Republican Conr.;ress. 
lie then noted t hat the platform adopted by the Republi-
cans c~lled for le~islation to remedy the ho~sing shortage, 
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curb infla.ti on and increase social security. The Eightieth 
Cone:ress had already f t) iled to act on these proposal s 
therefore: 
"On the twenty-sixth day of July, which out in 
Missouri we call 1 Turnip Day, 1 I am going t o call 
Coneress back and ask them to pass laws to halt rising 
prices , to meet the housing crisis--which they are 
saying t hey are for in their paltform. Now, my friends, 
if there is any ~eality behind that Republican plat form 
we ought to see some actlon ·ou.t of a short session of 
t he Eightieth Congress. They aam do this job in fifteen 
days if they want to do it . They wll l still have time 
to run for office . . . . rtlha.t the worst r.:1ghtieth Con rees 
does in its special session will be t he t Pst •• • • The 
America.:1 people •• ,will decide the r ecord . 11 79 
Truman was gambling that the Republican leadership 
would not push through his prop~sed leGislation and take 
credit for it. Bmt he felt he had no choice. As Clark 
Clifford, Truman ' s top political a.dviser , put it: We ' ve 
(30t our backs on our own one-yard line eith a minute to 
play; it has to be raz zle-dozzle.tt Moreover 7 Truman tvas 
really fairly c~nfident that the Republicans would not call 
his blurr. 
Congress lived up to 'L'ruman's expectations and did 
''lo thln_;: 8tit>rJt c.~nt t;..J.l abo ut inflation, the housing shortage, 
civil rir ht s or a.ny other' problems. Less than t\·Jo weeks 
lat er, Conf ress went home leavin~ behind a fr esh supply of 
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ammu.niticn for Truman . 
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chapter v..i..i 
The •• ignorable" Solid South had had enough. On Sa tur-
day, July 17th, Democrats fro ru all over the South and Cali-
formia, Indiana and Maryland met in Birmingham, Alabama. 
The Dixiecrat~ one day convention was a rousinp affair, 
but notably absent were the Southern politicians of stature . 
The~efore, t he nominations went to the two prime movers , 
Governor J . Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Fieldine; 
8 1 
L. wvri£5ht of Mississippi . 
Their pl c:. tf'orm said, '' We stand for the segree:a tion of 
the race s and the r acial in:t'egrity of each r a ce." Thurmond 
then so.id) 
"We believe that there are not enou gh hoops in the 
Army to force the Southern people to admit the Ner:roes 
into our theaters, swi 1 ing poofus, and homes •••• If 
t he South should vote for Truman tbls yea,r, we might 
as wll petition the Government for colonll.al status • • . • " 82 
The Southern revolt was perplcxin~ . The strong civil 
rie::hts pl a tform wns obviously not supported by Truman, a r d 
the Southerners must have lmovm this . However, tempers had 
been rous ed , and lor ic was no longer in control . The revolt, 
however, \'la s serious . lt would r(..(pture the Solid South 
rrhich was a problem Tru.rnan hsd not prepared for . All White 
:rouse strategy had been bull t on the a ssumption that the 
117 electoral votes of the Solid South were in the bae. 
83 
"Now t he bag was l eaking ." 
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chapter viii 
Philadelphia. host ed a third political convention be-
elnning Friday' July 23rd--that of Henry '1'/allace Is Pro-
gressive Party. In the same hall used by the Democrats 
a.nd Republic t- ns, the FrogrAasives formally nominated Henry 
Wallace for President and Democra.tic Senator Glen Tay lor 
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of Idaho for Vice President . 
Wallace had se~med to be t he spiritual heir of Roose-
velt, and a. real attraction among liberals . His progressl ve 
stands were considered sure magnets for votes . Hew.s an 
unusual sort of politician--a scientist, a peace advo cate, 
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an intellectual, an idealist ana dev.out Christain . 
The ?roJ:"ressi ve Party of r· 1 9L~8 was unique among major 
thrid party movements, for it was clearly dominat ed by the 
Communist Party. Moat of the members were non-Communist, 
but many w1lllngly collaborated with Communits because they 
were to politicall y unsophisticated to recognize one . Thi s 
becawe the largest and most successful electoral effort 
even launched by the Communists , because Wallace, though 
never a Communist himself, allowed himself t o be used for 
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their purposes. 
Wallace broke with Truman over our foreign policy 
toward Russia. . He hoped to influence the Truman administration 
to1trard a more so operative and understanding position in rega rd 
t o the Soviet Union . Wallace was more readily disposed to 
question the motives of his own gove rnment tha.n to impue:ne 
the sincerity of a foreign power. Truman, however, was in 
-35-
no mood to overlook the expanslonest program of Russia, and 
the conflict resulted. 
Early in 1948 Wallace ' s following appeared to be ex-
tens ive . After the victory of his candida te, Le o Isacson, 
in the Bronx 24th Congressional District election, Truman 
and his staff recognized him as a threat. Truman began to 
offset Wallace ' s appeal by incorporatinp- Wallace's programs 
into his own. '11 11U8 , Tt>tunan took action to recoup some of 
the damage done when he repudiated the Palestive partition. 
Truman blamed the Stete Department for hls original mistake 
and recoe;nized Israel on May 14th eithin minutes a fter it 
had beeome a state . Also, Trnman's civil rights message of 
February 2nd, was moti vated by a desire to offset 'Nallace 1 a 
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appeal to the Negroes. 
The Wallace movement turned out to be a fiasco in the 
end because he could e;et no real supr:ort from l abor . He 
did manage to get en the ballot in forty-four states, but 
in order to get enough signatures to do this '1fallace was 
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forced to peak too soon. 
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chapter ix 
11 Nice guys don 1 t win bellgames , ·~ Leo Durocher one 
observed . The same is too often true O.L' the game of pol-
itics , and never has thio been more oubstanti ated than in 
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the :Presidential carnpa.lgn of' 1948. 
Republican Thomas Dewey made the 11e;reat miscalculation" 
of his political career when he deliberately chose to war.e 
a 11hitrh-leve:1! campaif)n . His cruupaign eff'ort was as tidy 
as a new pln , abundantly financed and organized wlth me-
ticulous efficiency. The polls , press and politicql ex-
perts told Dewey he could not lose, so he dod not campaign 
to win but to set up the gu ideposts of his new administra-
tion . Dewey's rich commanding baritone exuded so much 
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confidence t t1at he put his audiences to sleep . 
Democrat _Harry Truman, just as deliberately, chose the 
low road--a choice of necessity, No one believed he cot ld 
win. The .r.~arty treasury was empty, the party orc;anization 
was in chaos, and the President was on the ~efensive. So 
he fought with the heedless , slam-bang ferocity of the 
underdog who knows there is only one way out--and he set 
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the public's imagination afire . 
Late in June Clifford sent a memorandum to Truman say-
11 Thls election can only be won by bold and daring 
steps calcul ated to reverse the powerful trend now 
runnin~ against us . The boldest and most popular 
step the President could possibly take WOl.Jld be to call 
a special session of Congress early .in August. This 
would: (1) focus attention on the rotten record of 
the Eightieth Conf!re ss, trrhich the lepublicans and 
the press will try to malte the country fort:'et; ( 2) 
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force Dewey and Warren to defend the actions of Congress 
and make t hem accept Congress as a basic issue; (3) 
keep the steady glare of publicity on the Neanderthal 
man Of the Republican pa~ty, who will emba~rass Dewey 
and Warren; (4) split the Republicans on how to deal 
~,o. ith such major issues as housine , inflation, foreign 
pollcy, etc., and (5) give President Truman a chance 
to follovl through on the flghting start he made on his 
western tour. 
This course may be ha.za.rdous poli tioally, but we cannot 
s hut our eyes to the f ·~ ct that President Truman !laces 
an uphill f lght to win the coming election~· 92 
This led to the special sessionof Conr ress which was 
a farce, but it dld put the Republicans on the spot . 
The Deiltocratic campaign was geared to attract four 
distinct groups--labor, the farmer, Negroes and the con-
sumer. Truman had predicted tha t the liberals and la.bor 
leaders would come back into the fold after t te convention, 
and he was right . They really had no place else to go. 
Gerald W. Johnson expressed this sentiment in the New~ 
~: 
"The great argwnent for the President had no ref-
erence- at all to Truman . · It is simply this: Take a 
look at t he others. Stacked up against the Archangel 
Gabriel, Truman doesn ' t look so EOOd , by stacked up 
against the array opposing him he begins to look like 
the Archangel Gabriel. After all. Gabriel is not a 
candidate . " 93 
The Americans for Democratic Aetion, t he Liberal Party 
in New York, t~e International Ladies Garment Workers Unlon , 
and t he Cone:ress of Industrial Organizations all now endorsed 
Truman. His veto of the Taft-Hartley Act and the recognition 
of Is;r>ael had payed off . The rest \'iere leaning between Truman 
o~ Wallace . Dewey never make an inroad lnto the l abor or 
9LI-
lJ.beral vote . 
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Truman started his campaign with a speech in Detroit . 
This was a 11 labor city, 11 and Truman came out with another 
vicious attack on the 11do-nothing 11 Eigl·l tieth Congress and 
the Taft-Hartley Act they had passed. Dewey chose to i gnore 
Tr1..1.man ' s attack which set the strategy for both men's cam-
95 
palgn . 
After l abor had come baclc to Truman, he turned his 
attention to the farmers, who h3d reasons for grumbling . 
The basis of the farmer's trouble was the crop surpl us 
produced in 1948. All summer rraln proces had been dropping 
steeply . Truman manat~ed to blame their troubles on his 
right are--the Eightieth Congress . 
The farmer , ordinar ily , cot.ld store his surplu s grain 
in gove1nment silos until prices rose. Then he coul d sell 
at a profit on the open marltet. The Commodity Credit Cor-
poration loaned the farmer money on the crops stored . But in 
renewing the · C. C.C.'s authorization in 1948, Congress had 
failed to atlthorize the building of any addi tiono.l storap;e 
bi ns . Wben the 1948 harvests came in, the C.C.C . ran out 
of storage bins , and the farmers were forced to sel l at. a 
96 
low market price . 
In his first major farm spee ch at Dexter , Iowa, on 
September 18th, Truman sai d : 
11 1'his Republican Congress has already stuck a pi tch-
fork 1n the farmers' back. They have alre~dy done their 
best to l .. eep pri ce supJ;Orts from work lng . • •• big bus-
iness lobbyists and speculators persuaded the Concress not 
to provide storage bins for you farmers . They tied 
the hands of the administration. They are preventing 
us from setting up the stora~e b i ns that you wil l need 
in order to get the support price for your grai n ." 97 
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The farmers , usually a Republican stron~hold, were 
suddenmy thinlcine: Deruocra tic; Dewey did nothing to stop 
this. But Dewey was at a disadvantt~.e:e--he had been con-
centrating on Nert Yor:~ politics for so lone that he knew 
very little o.f t he for.111ers' problems. His advisors were 
•lso big city politicians, so there was no one who could 
tell him t he wlstake he was making. The farmers could 
remember nothin~ Dewey had said precisely because Dewey 
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had said n~thinF . 
•.rruman' s election campa ien was mostly two cross-coun-
try tours patterned after his ''whl s tlestoppine:" tour of 
June. He was a.t his best makinf~ brief, impromptu speeches 
at whistle stops alone the way. Their finances were low, 
but they manac:ed to turn this to their advantage . On sev-
eral occasions to dramatize the party's financ ial pl i ght, 
Finance Chairman Johnson allowed t he network's to cut the 
President off the air before he had finished his speech. 
Once, when a net-fork official warned that Truman would be 
cut o:f:'f unless the Democrats lJUt up more money . Johnson 
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told h~m: "Go ahead . That wi ll tnean another milllon votes." 
Dewey also traveled the country in a campaign train 
with his staff of experts and advisors. They even spoke 
at SOq!e of the same places. (But everywhere Truman v1as 
attr~:~ctine· bie: er audiences t han Dewey . Reporters explained 
this away by s aying that the voters \'/eY"c. turnlne out to see 
President Tru1nan and his family , rather than Democratic 
candidate Truman.) Dewey •s big issuet if there was one , 
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was unity. nour future and the peace of the world are st.:lked 
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on bow 1.mi ted the people of America are, 11 he proclaimed. 
In the interest of unity, Dewey even manaced t o talr:e 
a tolerant view of Democratic sins. 11 1 will not contend that 
all our difficulties today have been brought about by the 
present national administration. Some of the se unhappy 
condidtions are the results of circumstances beyond the 
cnntrol of any government . " A kindness Truman would never 
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have extended, and a t abtic the voters found,dull. 
The Frogressive Party which had begun with hopes of 
waging a populist cru sade t hat would bring support form farm 
and labor grot.ps. But by his a ttac!ts on Republican reaction, 
Truman had stol,en most of the issues and rcade the.uJ his own. 
Wallace found himself with only one .real issue--peace. i3ut 
in 1948 what ~/alla. ce called pe~ce , many Americans called 
appeasement. W~llace ' ~ pleas for coexistence with the Soviet 
'Lnion were undermined by the evidence of Ru.ssla 's ae:Fressive 
intentions; in February the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia 
and the Ber l in blockade in June. Wallace's refusal to dis-
avow Communist support .and the obviousness of Co~nmuni st s 
and the:i,r sympathizers in the cO'I...':ncil s of the Progressive 
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Party smeared his whole campairn with c.t Red brush . 
'l'he presence of' Henry Wallace was begim·ine: to pay off 
for Harry 1rru '!.an . The sentiment of the;: country was firmly 
behind Ol'f'uman's firm anti-Communist stand and a~ainst Wallace 
as the exponent of the Comurunist line . Had 1 t not been for 
the ingrained conviction that Trumun didn't stand a chance, 
it vrould have been evident t hat the President, by bis a.nti-
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Communist s t and , was e:aininc. ground. 
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The Dixiecrat States' Rights campai13n headed by Gov-
ernor Strom Thurmond had been virtua l l y assured thirty-
eight electoral votes from the four Southern states '"here 
he had been made the Democratic Party ' s official candidate. 
Thurmond tried to build on thls foundation by c~mpaigning 
for "racia l purity" and "st tes ' rights . " He was a moderate 
on the race issue and rejected racial extremists such as 
Gerald L. K. Smith. He was a believer in the justice of the 
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South's cause and ran a decent campaign . 
Thurmond soon fo nd tha,t support was no e~sy thing to 
find. t-1ost of the r ewspapers were against him. Ralph 
McGrill of t he Atlantic Constitution wrote, " 'tie vrill pay 
through the nose for the Dixiecrats a,s we still pay for the 
leadershi p which tool: us into tl1e 1r1e.r betv·men t he Sta tea 
to ' save u.s.' Is Harry Truman immortal? " Practical south-
eners saw no point in hurting Truman to help Dewey, whose 
rn.clal views were as bftd as Truman 1 s a.nd v1hosc party they 
intensely disturbed. What could they a.ccomplisll by throwing 
their votes away'? Thurmond found himself more a.ncl more 
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alone . 
'l'ruman kept slashing \in til the end. In one of his 
final s~eech€s, he e xpressed that at first he wac puzzled 
by Dewey•s refus al to discuss the issues. "But after I had 
analyzed the situation, I cD,1tJe to the co uclusion tha.t the 
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record of the Republican l'arty is much too bad to talk about. " 
The aft,ernoon of election doy Truman slipped ~way to 
Excelsior Sprinrs , t.Tissouri, where he bad a. Turkish bath and 
then went to his room . He had a ham sandwlch , a Glass of milk, 
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listened to some early returns, wGnt to bGd and went to sleep .. 
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chapter x 
The Chi cago Tribune's headline on the morning of 
November 3, 1948 read : "Dewey Defeats Truman ." Then · 
in their nationally syndicated column t hat day, the Alsop 
brothers had written: "Events will not wait patiently 
unt i l Thomas E . Dewey offlcally replaces Harry s. Trurnan. 11 
However , at 10 :30 A.M . eastern time the mornine aftEr 
e l ection ds~y, Dewey formally conceded . He told thv press : 
"r am as much surprosed as you are. I have read your stories . 
de were all wrong together . " Later Dewey was to sa.y that 
he felt like a man who woke up in a coffln wlth a li l ey in 
his u1ani. and wondered . "If I am alive, what am I doing here? 
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Amd if I ' m dead , why do I have to go to the bathroom? " 
On it ' s f r ont page , the Washington Post invited the 
President to a banquet attended by "political reporters , 
radi o commentators and columnists •. •. The main course will 
consist of breast of old crow en glace (You will eat tur1~ey) ." 
No major publicati on escaped without embarrassment , ar'ld one 
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by one they apologized to ole "Give ' em hell" Harry. 
1rhe general public , thouf!h they elected Harry , \vere 
also amazed . They too had read the newspapers and the polls. 
The big question was, "How could all those experts be so 
wrong? " Truman liad held Dewey to a lower percentage of 
popular vote ( 45 . 1 ~~ to Truman ' s 4 9. 61C) than Dewey had t>e-
11 0 
ceived in 1944 (46 . 03% ) against Roosevelt . 
Moat political experts n.re convinced t ha t the Repub-
lican victory waa thrown avu:..y because of over reliance on 
.. 
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the polls . Because of this Dewey's campaign strategy was 
to give Truman the silent treatment. Dewey and his staff 
h.-new the dt., ngers of an outspoken camp~:tirn . The poll l)re-
dlctions, giving Dewey a commanding lead, assured hlrn thut 
a '1kkep silent" strategy would be safest. Dewey's fixed 
plan of action robbed his 11 overthouE•ht 11 ca111pal en of the 
spontaneity, or1g1rJali ty and mobility which Truman enjoyed 
b v playing the game by ear. De\vey permitted a. Republican 
Congeess which had motable accomplishments to be br·nded a 
"do-nothing" Conp-ress; he allowecl Truman to brank the Taft-
Hartley law as a 11 slave labor act 11 after Tl:'Uman himself had 
urged tl1nt he be allowed t,o draft striking railroad workers; 
Dewey let Truman t r lte credl t for high prices and hip:h wac:es 
and yet blame t' e Republicans for not controlling inflation; 
he d id not challenre Truman when he called a tax cut, which 
relieved 7,400 , 000 from payinr taxes, a "rich man 1 s t ax biJ::l'; 
he let Truman blame the Republicans for a grain storage 
shortage which was the fault of the Administration; he 
completely sldppod the issues of ComulUnists in Governmer1 t, 
and the arrors :nade by Truman • s men abroad in dea.ling with 
Communism . As a result, the Republicans remained apathetic 
and overconfident; many simply clid not bother to vote . 
Dewey inspired no one; in contrast, Dewey seemed dead while 
1 1 1 
Truman ,was not so efficient but very much alive . 
For the pollsters, the shock of t he election linfered 
after the disbelief had worn off. Their humiliation taur ht 
them a lession they will never forret--take nothinr for 
granted. In his first post election report Elmo Roper said: 
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11 1 could not hcve been more wrong . 1'he thing t11at bothers 
11 2 
me most is that at thls moment I don't knww why I was wrone: ~" 
Truman had won a plurality of over 2,000,000 votes, 
but a swinf! to Dewey of 30,000 votes, appropriately dis-
tributed in Illinois , Ohio and California, would have e:iven 
Dewey the Presidency . Wallace had ·made a very poor showinr.: 
getti nr only 1,1 57 , 326 votes. However , he did cause Truman 
tCJ lose New Yorl. , Maryland and .Michigan. Thurmond had 
received 38 electoral votes, 1 ,176,125 popular votes , from 
four southern states--Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi 
and South Carolina. Hls 39th electoral vote ce.me form 
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a Democrat elector in Tennessee . 
Truman's winninc coal i tion of states were vGry similar 
to the clesign wade by Clifford in 1947. The !'resident 
t ook every Western state but Oregon, seven of the eleven 
in the South, the four border ste.tes of Kentucky , Oklahoma , 
West Virginia and kissouri, five states in t he Midwest--
Illinois, Iowa, Ohio , ~innesota and Wisconsin; his only 
victories in the northeast were lvfassachusetts and Rhode 
11 # 
Island. 
The voters who made up the successful coalition c ~ me 
from the same source e.s had F'DR 1 s SUJ)port. Wben the popular 
vote is analyzed, it is found that Truman held most of the 
South, ran wellin the urban North (here Wallace ctlt into 
his vote) , successfully c~ptured theWest, and also hsd 
great success in the Midwest farm belt, usually Republican 
ground . It had been widelh a f'r;umed that Roosevelt ' s coali 
tion had been sh~ttered Lecause of the Wallaceites and 
TOTAL 1948 ?RESIDBNTIAL VOTE FOR DEWEY, TRUlv.iAN, 
WALLACE, THURMOND AND OTHERS 
Percentage of total vote 
State Total vote Der,.rey Truman Wallace Thurmond Others 
Alabama 214,980 19 .o .7 79.7 .5 
Arizona 177,065 43.8 53.8 1 • 9 .5 
Arkansas 242,475 21 .o 61 .8 . 3 16.5 .4-
California 4,021 J 538 47.1 47.6 4.7 a .5 
Colorado 515,237 46.5 51 .9 1 .2 .4 
Connecticut 883,518 49.5 47.9 1 .6 1 .o 
Delaware 139 , 073 50.0 48.8 .8 .4 
Florida 577,64-3 33.6 48.8 2.0 15 . 5 
Georgia 418,760 18.3 60 .8 .4 20.3 .2 
Idaho 214,816 4-7.3 50 .0 2 7, .4 • ..I 
Illinois 3,984,046 49.2 50.1 .7 
Indiana 1 ,656, 214 49.6 48.8 .6 1 • 1 
Iowa 1,038,264 47.6 50.3 1 .2 .9 
Kansas 788,819 53.6 44.6 .6 1 .2 
Kentu.cky 822,658 41 • 5 56.7 .2 1 • 3 .3 
Louisiana 416,326 17.5 32.7 .7 49.1 
Maine 264 ,787 56.7 42.3 .7 . 3 
Maryland 596 '735 49 .L~ 48.0 1 • 7 .4 .5 
Massachusetts 2' 155,347 42.2 53.4 1.8 2.6 
Michigan ~,109,609 49.2 1~7 .6 2.2 1 .o 
~iinnesota 1,212,226 39.9 57.2 2 .3 .6 
Mississippi 192' 190 2.6 10 .1 • 1 87.2 
Missouri 1,578,628 41 .s 58.1 . 3 .1 
Montana 224,278 43.1 53.1 3 . 3 .5 
Neb:baska 488,939 511 .• 2 45.8 
Nevada 62 , 117 I.J-7 .3 50.4 2.4 
New Hampshire 231 ,440 52 .4. 46.7 .9 0 • 1 
New Jersey 1 ,949,555 50.3 45.9 2.2 1 .6 
New Nexico 185,767 43.2 56.8 
New York 6 ,27I.J-~527 1~5 .3 l.j.Lj .3 8.1 2 . 3 
North Carolina 791,209 32.7 58.0 . 5 8.8 
North Dakota. 220 ,71 6 52.2 43.4 3.8 .2 .5 
Oh i u 2 , 936 ,071 49.2 1~9 .5 1.3 
Oklahoma 721 ,599 37.3 62.7 
Oregon 524,080 49.8 46.4 2. 9 1 .o 
Penns;rl vania 3,735,149 50,9 46.9 1 .5 .7 
Rhode Island 326,098 41 .4 57.8 .8 
South Carolina 1 L1-2, 571 3 . 8 2/.j .• 1 • 1 72.0 0 
South Dakota 250' 105 51 .8 47.0 1 • 1 
Tennessee 550,283 36.9 49.1 .3 13.4 .2 
TOTAL 1948 PRESIDENTI4L VOTE FOR DErNEY, TRU¥~N, 
~1ALLACE • THURI·WND A11) OTHERS_lContinued) 
Percenta~e of total vote 
State ~otal vote De,tr~Y Truman Wallac~ Thurmond Others 
Texas 1, 1l!·7 , 245 24 .6 65,4 . 3 9 .3 
Utah 276,305 45.0 54· .o 1 .o 
Vermont 123 , 382 61 .5 36.9 1 .o 
Virginia 419,256 41 .o 47.9 .5 1 0 . it 
washington 905,059 42.7 52 . 6 3.5 
West Virginia. 74.8 ,750 42.2 57.3 .4 
Wisconsin 1 '276 ,800 46.3 50.7 2 .0 
Wyomine: 101 ,L~25 47 . 3 51 .6 . 9 
United States 48,833,680 45.0 49.4 2.4 2 .. 4 
Based on Statistics of .:t_he Presidential and Cong:vessional 
Election of November 2, 19'48, compiled from ~ffioial sources by 
William Graf unde · direction of Ralph R. Roberts, Clerl{ of the 
House of Representatives (Government J?rinting Office, 1949 ) . 









McCartP,.y, Eli S. Marks, David B. Truman, eds . , ..TI:!2 Pt~e-election 
Folls of 1948, (New Yorkt: Social Science Res~a.rch Council, i 949), 
p. 316-317. 
Dixiecrats. Actually these revolts strengthened Truman 
as was shown in Sam Lubell 1 s Th~ Future of Amceri~ Pol-
itics. The Dixiecrats siphoned off some votes, but they 
also solidified support for Truman among certain groups of 
traditionally Democratic voters.and lent credibility to 
1 is· civil rights programs . Henry Wallace's calllpalgn made 
Truman invulnerable to the char~es of belng too 11 aoft 11 on 
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communism . This strengthened him among Catholic voters. 
Still the question,how had al l the experts been so 
wrong? Everybody's miste.lres, in the end , were attributed 
to the polls. One correspondent c onfessed : " I was too 
gutless to put stock in my, own personal hunch, based on 
nothlne: better t''lan tours of the area, chats with businessmen, 
union men , miners , ranchers, farmers, political leaders ." 
He felt he couldn't pin down his hunch, so he followed the 
trend shown by the yolls . Local politlcal leaders relied 
heavily on the polls, so when a reporter interviewed a local 
leader, he often only picked up the information obtained 
rrom the polls the leader hnd read. 
In another ins tance the Staley Millinr Company, a 
Kansas City feed supplier , co!'ducted an informal poll among 
1 t!s customers by havinr~ the farmers register their prefenence 
by buying sacks of feed with either a yicture of a donkey 
or an elephant on it. In September , after 20,000 farmers 
in six Midwestern states he~d been ....... olled , the reaul t was 
fifty-four percent for Trt~an to forty-six percent for Dewey. 
"We read the Gallup and Roper .r: ol ls that 1t1ere all f or Dewey, 11 
a company offical explained, 11 and we decided that our results 
116 
were too improbable, 11 
THE FORECASTS OQIIIPARED wirH ELECTION RESULTS 
Percentage of total presidential vote 
Dewey Truman Thurmond ~/all ace Total~ 
Nati onal vote 
.12..J.. !!2.:..2 2.4 2 .4 _99 . 4 
Crossley 49 . 9 4Lf .8 1 . 6 3.3 99 .6 
Gallup 49 . 5 44 . 5 2 .0 4 .0 100 . 0 
Roper 52 . 2 37.1 5.2 4 . 3 98 .8 
-ti•Exclusi ve of percente.ges for 111inor candidat..es. Gallup 
percentages calculated on total vote for four principal can-
didates . 
STATE-BY- STATE ERRORS lN PREDlCTlON 
Forecast percentage roi- Number of state errors Number of state errors 
nus election percentage i n Crossley predictions in Gallup predictions 
From - 12.0% to -10 . 1% 2 .lj 
-10 . 0% to - 8 . 1% 4 2 
- 8.0% to - 6. 1% 5 9 
- 6 . 0% to - 4. 1% 13 12 
J.~ . O% to - 2 .1 % 12 14 
2.0% to - • t% 7 2 
0 % to 1. 9% 2 1 
2.0% to 3.9% 0 0 
4 . 0% to 5.9% 1 0 
6 . 0% to 7. 9% 1 0 
Total number of states forecast 47 44 
Talten from : FredericL Mosteller, Herbert Hyman , .?hilip J. 
McOart~y , Eli S . Marks , David B. Truman, eds . , The Pre-election 
:Polls of 1948 , (New Yorlc : Social Science Research Cour1cil, 1 949), 
p . 298- 299 . 
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The p:ress were also mislead by the polls . The report-
era were meticulous in reporting crowd turnouts but were 
unwilling to de<.w conclusions which differed with the polls. 
Thus the great cncwds which 'l'ruman. drew the last. few weeks 
of his campaign led almost no one to suspect that he might 
win. The crowds were attributed to the "entertainment value" 
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of see1n.v any President and his f amily . 
Eight days after the election , the Social Science 
Research Council set UJ a committee to analyze where the 
pollsters had mt~de their mistakes . The Gallup, Roper and 
Crossley organizations alJ cooperated in the invest1vation. 
The commi ttee issued lt ' s report on December 27, 1948 , and 
a ccording t o t he m the _gollsters made many errors . 
( 1) All three polls had not considered the possibil-
ity of a decisive swine: to Truman in thelast two weeks of 
the campaign . 
(2) All three stppped polling too early . Gallup's 
final predict i on was based on samples taken ln mid- October; 
Croasley•s final forecast waa b a sed ona comb1nation of st~ tA 
surveys from mid-Au~ust , mid- September and mid- October; 
Roper ' s final estimat ion was from data he collected in 
August from w'1ich he pr edict ed De,,.. ey 1 s victory by such a 
mar gin thc t he discontinued periodic surveys, 
(3) All three assumed that the final staeoa of the 
campaign would have nc significant lmpact on the votes . 
Roper believed the entire dampaign was irrelevant . The 
absurdity of this a ssumption was shown when a post-election 
survey showed that one out of every seven voters claimed to 
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have made up their minds within the last fourteen days of 
the campaign ; three-quarters of these delayed decl s lons 
favored Truman . 
(4) The polls contained errors in sampling and 
lnterviewine techniques, which r esulted l n too few inter-
views with people of grade school education and thus an 
underestimation of the Democratic vote. 
After 1948 the poll takers became a more modest and 
humble lot; their techniques improved considerably. They 
gained a renewed awareness of the unpredictability of both 
l~aders~ip in a democracy and of tb e choices that voters 
make in the privacy of the votine booth . Take nothing for 
11 8 
pranted--particularly the American voter. 
To further anal yze the election of 1 94~ we must take 
into consideration the pe~sonalities or the two major can-
did~tes . Immediately after the Republican convention Dorothy 
Thom1-son noted tha t Dewey's successful C!J.Omlnation "represented 
the success of pollticr l techniques and the ~anagerial revo-
lution •• • • Yet I had the impression by no means unique to 
myself that if he had been defe~ted more people would have 
11 9 
been pleased with themselves. 11 
After the ele ction, J ames Roosevelt, Sta te Che. irman of 
California , said, 11 lssues didn't matte in ~94,8 . The people 
didn't want Dewey . 11 Abe Goff, defeated for re-election . in 
Idaho , tells of five ftienda meeting the day after election, 
each of whom voted for Truman because the:v didn't take to 
Dewey. Also the Democrats played up an example of Dewyy 's 
pet time as , tel line· how Dewey toolt a. plane from LaGuardJ.a 
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Airport eight miles to Idlewild kir}Dort so t'1at he, lil.e 
Truman, could arrive in a plane for the ded~cation ceremonies . 
But Harry , in contrast, represented the backbone of 
America--a common man. He was a Lion, ~oose, Elk, member 
of the American Legion, V.F.W . , Order of Alpha, Society for 
the Preservation of Barbershop Singing and a 33rd deerree 
Mason . He portrayed a picture of an underdog gallantly 
fighting on against all o~ds . This kind of appeal r ates 
12 1 
second only t o the price of corn in its result. 
"There were t hose--there are those--who say Harry 
S. Trum "ln is an opportunistic and say lt t o mean that 
he vrould ride anybody' s coat-tails to p:e t ahead. This 
may be; contrary to popular opinion, some politicians 
are smart enough to be opportunists and not lool{ lih.e 
the opoula r opinion of what an opportunist looks like . 
It may be that Harry S, Truman ' s great political in-
vention has been to coldly, deliberately , always glve 
the people what they need , and to hell with the special 
interedts becau s e all the interests can give yo ~ is 
money, whereas the peopl e vot e . And Harry has never 
~een interest ed in ~ettine money , except at a riducu-
lously low wa5e per pound of effort expended, even 
1tJhen he needed it very badly for per - onal ree s Lns . 
It may be that Harry Truman was open to being bougl1 t 
in exchange for power at the polls. In a nation where 
the gov"n:'runen.t i ~ supposeJ tu be of , '.J,y , a.nd for t he 
poeple, that's where th•:- power comes from. A st:ur'l.,Y of 
Harry Truman ' s career leaves one with the conviction 
(of) ho\'r much easier, more permanent, and more popular 
Hurry ' s way 1 s . 11 1 22 
T4k£",1/ l?ru;N : Ru66'~C" ~#fJA-.U.. ,, 111/Y a~~l'.,.dltJ ,, I /1,#18'Lt"u~ Jle-~l T"~ 
tftr ( rlANe", ,,~ P), P. 111. 
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chapter xi 
"One ca.ndida te snys he oueht to be rresident because 
hi s Vice Presidential candidate is better than anybo~ 
else's. O:nother sa.y1::1 tH.1 ought to be President because 
he will run over any anarchist who lies down infromt 
of his car. A third-by all odds the runaway f avorl te--
hardly s ays anything substantial at all. " 
123 
This was campaign '68. 
My name 1a 
Richard Milhous Nixon 
And I hope that you're 
All fixin 1 to 
Just tiptoe 
Through the issues 
With me. 
Don ' t want to analyze, 
I ' d r ather generalize 
So please don ' t eriticize. 
Simply close your eyes 
And tiptoe 
Through the issues 
With me. 
James Symington 
This was the e s sence of the Republican campaign of 
1960 . To a nation nervous over the problems of war, civil 
crime and violence , inflation-- Nixon vowed to " sock lt to 'em. " 
However, this gave a misleading impress ion as the triclcy 
slogan masked the true mature of the Nixon game . Nixon 
set the pace of his campaign with mechanical efficiency using 
unemotional drive to take Amer•ica by shrewd calculation . 
Nixon wa s in the lead and playing it safe . He avoided a 
r epea t of ~he debate a ebacle o£ 1960; he moved at a leisurel y 
pace instead of i n a mad swirl knowing that his exhaustion 
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caused him to make costly m_stakes in 1960 . 
Nixon got his base of support in the small Northern 
towns and among whi te :P:r·otestants . Small town residents 
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distressed over city conditions l ooked to Nixon for a 
quieting change as did the wealthier cuburbanites , The 
GOP base broadened somewhat in the under 35 and the college-
educated vote . s ·ome of these moved fr.om the Democratic 
p~ rty in reaction to the Chi cago convention . 
Nixon 1 s Dewey campaign strEo.tegy gathered in enough 
diverse groups to elect a minorlty President. Nixon dis-
played his abil ity to put a party and a succes sful dampaign 
together. But we have not yet seen if he has the inne~ 
sources of mind and spirit that separates the skilled 
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technician from a memorable leader of men . 
On the shores of the Potomac 
By the gently Johnson Bombing 
Stood the might Happy Worrier 
"Crying Hubert," was his name. 
It's been many years a fleeting 
Since Hubert started fighting 
Mayor Humphrey's still repeating 
The messages of yore. 
While his courage and his foresight 
Enriched his climb to power 
Lyndon Johnson with his own plight 
Made Hubert's chances sour. 
So let us not forget Horatio 
Undergog that he be 
As Smiling Hubert runs for President 
Reminding both you and me. 
-51 .. 
J'erome Bork and Oloene Bigp-s 
Wl th the desperation o1' the underdoe , Humphrey r an h1a 
campaign full steam ahe!:.d. His basic tactic wa.s to give the 
Refu blicans more "hell" than anyone since Harry Truman. He 
damned Nixon as "Fearless Fosdick" for cling i r1g to the law 
and order issue and as "Richard t be Chickenhearted" for evading 
debate. 
With his party in chaos, his treasury all but empty and 
prospects looking very bleak, Humphrey r e fused to give up. 
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In late September he dubbed himself '1the Lonesome Ran~er" 
a.nd he rode himself mercileesly in an effort to let the 
people know t he real Hubert Humphrey. By Humphrey's sheer 
determination and zeal he managed to bring a momentum to 
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his own drive that seemed impossible after the corJVention. 
Humphrey's usually boyyant expression af.ten became 
clouded with pain and confusion. He could not comprehend 
why, in view of hie necord, he was looked upon as a member 
of a system that had proved unresponsive to the problems of 
today. He ~ad· always been a liberal, but now, because of 
his loyalty to his Pflesident, he was considered a member 
of the party moderates. Hubert was deeply grateful to 
Johnson for al l the help Jo"•nson had given hilD in the Sen-
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ate and later. 
Humphrey had always been s cour ageous liberal. As 
mayor of Minneapolis, at tl1e a~· e of 34, he had cleaned up 
the police force, reduced cirme and aided schools. He had 
palced his political ca r eer on the line in 1948 wheq at the 
Democrt tic Convention, he forced through a stronc cl vil 
rights plank. He had crusaded for Medicare 15 years before 
it became law; propsed a Peace Corps nine months berore it 
was established; strove valiantly f or peace as was seen in 
his struggle for ena.ctwent of the Nuclear Test Ban 'rreaty. 
He failed t o see how people could not remember all of t his--
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the truth is he could not shak.e t he Johnson stigma . 
Run them over 
I'm the drover 
And 1 will make you free 
If you agree with me. 
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Communist and Anarchist--Listen herel 
Wallace will never fear 
In front of his car you lie 
And there you're gonna die! 
Blaclr man io not crazy 
He's just a little lazy 
O~r pure women he will li1rty 
If ever \<Te give the chance. 
Jerome .Borlt and Cloene Bi ggs 
The band blared out "Dixie," and a knot of pwople closed 
in around three silent black demonstrators yelling , "Kill 
'er.o l Kill 'eml 11 The true believers waved rebel fla gs and 
cheered, b~t the man merely grinned and greeted his crowd. 
"We not a sectional movement--we national!" h e shouted and 
here in Madison Square Garden he had rarely been more con~ 
vincing. In very polite language, George Wallace ws s running 
a caillpaign for President of the United Str tes filled with 
rac i al prejudice, bigotry and pul;le hate--hate for anyone· 
different or who dared to disar ree. And the s t unning fact 
of this campaign autumn Wets tha t Wallace alone among the 
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candidates had really c&Pured the public's 1magin9t1on . 
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The domestic scene had been full of unrest and violence 
for the last few ye~1 ra . From "Communist inspired" student 
anti-war demonstrations to actual violent racial disturbances 
and a large number of Amer•icans were either sca red or angry, 
They were looking f or a r a.dica l change v1hich would t d{e 
t J em back to the days when disturbances of' this ki nd were 
not the rule b~t the exception. Suspi cious, hate-filled, 
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reactionary Americans ha d fina l ly found a l ~ader. 
TOTAL 1968 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR 
NIXON I RU.rvT.FHREY AND WALLACE 
Percentage of total vote 
State Total vote Humphrey Nixon Wallace 
Alabama 921 ) 1 97 14 14 66 
Alaska 20,176 43 1~7 10 
Arizona 376,325 35 50 9 
Arkansas 258,692 31 28 11.1 
California 6,231 ,693 46 47 7 
Colorado 795,378 42 51 7 
Connecticut 1 ,259,529 50 1~4 6 
Delaware 211 ,413 42 45 13 
Dist Columb 166,069 82 18 
Florida 1 ,874,077 30 40 30 
Georgia 907,410 26 29 45 
Hawaii 178,447 58 1~1 1 
Idaho 267,368 31 56 13 
Illinois 3 , 580,231 45 46 8 
Indiana 1,970,052 38 50 12 
lO\<Ta 1 '087 '733 4-1 53 6 
Kansas 765,796 35 55 10 
Kentucky 955,277 38 4·4 18 
Louisiana 1,066,065 29 23 48 
Maine 360,289 56 43 2 
Maryland 1 , 197,81 9 43 42 1 5 
Massachusetts 1,878,067 63 32 5 
Michigan 2,258,612 49 41 10 
Minnesota 1 '461~ ' 01 4 54 42 5 
lVlisslssi ppl 620 , 386 23 14 61! 
Missouri 1,567,776 45 44 1 1 
Montana 163,751 44 49 7 
Nebraska 441 ,683 33 59 8 
Nevada 133,332 40 47 13 
New Hampshire 279,345 44 52 4 
New Jersey 2,761,718 44 46 9 
New Mexico 309,365 40 52 8 
Ne\1 York 6,632,250 50 44 5 
North Carolina 1 '553, 577 29 39 31 
North Dakota 190 '994 39 56 6 
Ohio 3,31.~8,785 43 115 12 
Okhlloma 859,065 32 47 20 
Oregon 608,965 43 58 7 
Pennsylvania 3,946,910 47 45 8 
Rhode Island 370,393 65 31 1.1 
TOTAL 1968 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR 
NIXON, HUMPHR1Y AND WALLACE (Continued) 
Fercentar e of total vote 
State Total vote Humphrey N~xon \'Tall ace 
South Carolina 637 ,624· 29 39 32 
South Dal~oto. 221,009 40 51 9 
Tennessee 1 • 180,371 28 38 31.1 
Texas 2,527 ,076 42 40 19 
Utah 418,773 36 57 6 
Vermont 156,736 44 53 3 
Virginia 1 ,330,434 33 43 24 
Washington 878,748 48 L~5 7 
Y./e st Virgirda 716,955 50 Ll·l 7 
Wisconsin 1,656,679 44 48 8 
Vlyoming 100,800 36 56 9 
United States 63,639,236 43.4 43.7 12.9 
* Results tabulated before all the precincts were counted 
Taken from: "Presidential Vote, 11 Arka.nsas Democrat, 




There e.re a number of similar1 ties existing in the 
candidates, issues and circums~ndes surrounding the Pres-
idential campaigns of <1J.948 and 1968. I am not sure if they 
men made tho conditions or if the conditions made themen. 
Richard Nixon ran tne same kind of campaign as dld 
Thomas Dewey. Nixon was not so confident as Dewey because 
pollsters learned t heir lessions will in 1 91.~8, but h e still 
had a com}:3ortable lead and ran hes campaign like a man who 
was wit ning . Nixon, as did Dewey, avoided Ulal..~hg a bi t:; 
is sue o1' the issues a d ran a tightly efficient, well-
o~anized, slig11tly boring campa i gn . In -:- he position of 
wi · ner, vith men were above mud~linging, hard-hittlne cam-
paigning. Ne ithe r did much to excite t he public, blht played 
1 t safe and got plenty ol' rest. The important. dl. ffere nce is 
the quality of advisors each man had wo r>ki · g for him. De\o\·ey 1 s 
men W01.lld htlVe been fine ii; t hey had cnly b Gen campaifl;nin6 
in l a r ge ubban areas . Howe,rE:r , tl1e a·IJs enee of anyone lmowled-
gable on the farming s ituation could very well be what cost 
Dewey the election. 
Nixon , on the other hand~ had an excellent staff of 
didicated me~, and he was covered inall areas vital to na-· 
tional campai gning . The one tl:h.in5 no one could do wt s e ove 
vitality and genuine enthusiasm t _, t he t ype of campaign 
Nlxon w~ s waging . Nl.xcn was saved by t he f~ ct U"' a t the 
voters want ed a change f orm the Johnson-Humphrey line without 
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reverting all the way back to Wallace--the Neanderthal man . 
Nixon was their only choice . 
The 1968 counterpart to Thurmond and his Dixiecrat 
Party w<-. s Geore;e C, 'llallace and his Amcrlcan Independent 
Party . Thur mond and the Dixiecrats bolted the r er;ular Dem-
ocratic Party because of tht stronr, civil rights planli in 
the plafor m. Thurmond, a moderate on the r~cial issue, did 
not cam:aign out of the South . He only received support 
from four of the Southern states. 'l'he majority of Southerners 1 
poll ticia.ns and voters alike, were not willing to endanger 
the South's strong position in Congress just to f ight Harry 
Truman . Besides , Dewey was just as bad as Truman on r r ce, 
and he was also a Republi can. Thurmond war~ed a d r.: cent 
campaign, but actually caused li •.tle excitement after the 
in tial t hurst was over, and tempers had t:l.me to cool. 
WaJlace a~d his American Independent Party were quite 
another st.ory. George Wallace l ed his followers out of the 
Democra$lic Party i n a l'i~~ht for racial purJ..t \ and strtes 1 
rif'hts. He campai13ned vigorousl y andmanat:ed to e:et on the 
ballot in all fifty states. His ~essa~e seemed to have a ~reat 
deal of a ppeal for those vot ers who were scared of the Negro 
revolution and "Oommunlst-in.~pired ' ' student derr.ons tra tions . 
Wallace warcd a fire and brimstone campaign based on fear 
and hate . He lllanaced to put some exci t ·cment ln whctt maght 
have otherwise been an even duller campalgn. Wallace received 
aro ,nd 13% of the national vote, c rrylng six Southe Y'n 
states snd cutting into the blu.e-collar and white suburban 
vote less taan expected. But as lone as t11ei't' are people who 
hate, Wallace will be around.again . 
W H E R E W A L L A C E R A N K S 
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30 
Taken f rom: Newsweek , November 11 , 1968 , p . 36 . 
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flarry 'rruman and Hubert Humphrey were both forced to 
wage Cl.<mpa.igna as the under{ioe;. They had n othi ne t o lose 
and everythine: to f!-c> ln from a hard-hi ttine <~ gut-level 
campaie:n. Truman traveled the n~tion 11 whistlestopping 11 
and letting the peo1.:.le see him . He used the Eir.h tieth 
Congre s s as t he whippin~ post tor all the ills of the nation, 
und mana.t)'ed. to build some enthusiasm for his cause . Truman 
was a genius when it came to understanding the people 
and the ir needs. He brou ght sympathy for h i mself by allow-
ing his speeched t o ue cut off for l t:t c~ ... of funds. .lme1·1cans 
in Truman's t ime , loved n othing better than a co,umon man 
unless it was an unde rdog--Harry \1'/as both. No one belelved 
he could !.'ossi Lily win, ar1d it Has a lonely can1pai r;n . However, 
Harry had some definite advanta~es--one bei~n the fac~ that 
he \laS the Pr e sident. This e abled him to get publicity, 
free, anytime he Y.ranted it, since anythint! the .President 
says io news. Truman Wt,! S probabl y not dr a stically b ehind 
Dewey .for very lqng, even thoueh the polls showed t hat he 
was . In 1948 ever yone wa s c onvinced early i n the year that 
Truman did not. lwve a chance . 'l'he pollsters , newsmen and 
political experts had all reached a cor clusion and then pro-
ceeded t o gather evidence t o support the ~r conclusion. 
They had predicted so loudly for so l one t h::Jt Truman could 
not wln, so that when evidence began to filter in indicatin~ 
that the tide had cha.ne:ed, it was i gnored . 
The pollsters would never arain repeat tl-).e mis take of 
1 gL~8. Therefore, in 1968 when it •:tas indicated that Hunrphrey 
would lose they were correct. George Gallup stated t~Lt 
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it was possible for him to pull an upset comparable to 
Harry 'r:r·uman ' a . Nixon had peaked too soon and had run 
out of 11 half-i s·~ues," a gre&t many people were tired of 
him . Dr. Gallup siad, "Humphrey · 'probably' would have 
won if the election had been u fe1N days later." 
Humphrey had to contend vii th a much stronger thlrd 
party than did Truman, but mainly Humphrey had to contend 
with discontent. The advanced news media has given the 
American people a chance to see the intricucies of their 
political system at work. Seeinl! the fiasco at :t:he Demo-
cratic Convention this year probably hurt Humphrey badly 
especially the youneer more idealistic vcters . 
Humphrey made a stronr. oush toward the end . He never 
pave up. The sti[~ma. of the Johnson ao.mir:istra tion was a 
handicap he could not ove rcOJ.ue . l?erhaps t he big difference 
ln the result ot the t 'rto elections is that Truman was al-
ready 1 ~"'esiL~ ent- -his own manj and Humphrey was not) and seemed 
unable to convince the voters that he ever could Le the 






THE POLLSTERS VS. THE VOTERS 
1968 
Actual Vote Gallup Gallup Harris Harris 
election eve Oct . 27 election eve Oct . 18 
43.7% 42% 4·4% 40% 40% 
43.3% 40% 36% 43% 35% 
13 .0% 14t~ 15% 13% H.l% 
4 "/ /<! 5% 4% 7% 
Taken from: Newsweek , November 11, 1968, p . 35. 
u.s. News & World Report, November 4, 1968 , 
p . hi . 
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45 . 3 
2 . 4 
2.4 
Estimated No . 
22,000,000 
17 , 000,000 
9,500,000 
500 , 000 
Votes Cas t 
24,179 ,623 
21 '991 ,290 
1 , 176 J 1 5.lf-
1 , 1 57,326 
- ')-,) h 
Taken from: John M. Fenton , In Your Opinion . •• , (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company , 1960), p . 63 . 
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VOTERS PUT NIXON ON THE MAP 
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